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ABSTRACT
Right of access to a court, enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms forms one of the basis for reinforcement of the principle 
of rule of law. However, the right of access to a court may be limited by provisions of national 
legislation regulating the functioning of the judicial system and rules of judicial procedure. The 
higher the hierarchy of the court, the more limits may be placed on the right of access to it. The 
aim of this article is to examine the different modalities of organisation of supreme judiciaries in 
European countries (members of the Council of Europe) and mechanisms established in national 
legislation for filtering applications to those jurisdictions in civil cases, in light of the principles set 
forth in that regard by the ever evolving case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
effects of its judgments and decisions on national legal systems.  
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Introduction
Rule of law and proper administration of justice are some of the fundamental 
principles of democratic societies and a cornerstone of European 
democracies. As the President of the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter: the European Court), The Honourable Judge Guido Raimondi 
said while opening the 2017 judicial year “[t]he rule of law is what sets Europe 
apart: it is one of the achievements of our civilisation, a rampart against 
tyranny. This is what Europe represents: a part of the world where the rules 
of the democratic game have been laid down, and where compliance 
with these rules is guaranteed by the Constitutional and Supreme Courts”1.
Indeed, national Supreme Courts play a crucial role in the protection of 
human rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the Convention on Human 
Rights) within the legal systems of each Member State of the Council of 
Europe.
In order to be able to benefit from the guarantees of rule of law protected 
by the Supreme Courts with regard to particular judicial proceedings 
concerning their rights and obligations, individuals first and foremost need to 
be able to exercise their right of access to those courts. Without the possibility 
of bringing their cases before Supreme Courts, the guarantees of rule of law 
vested in those highest national judicial authorities remain tenuous.
Scope of and limitations to right of access to 
appellate and cassation courts
Right of access to a court (particularly right of access to courts of higher 
instances), as guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on Human 
1 Raimondi, G., 2017. Solemn hearing for the opening of the Judicial Year, Opening address of the European Court 
of Human Rights President Guido Raimondi. Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20170127_
Raimondi_JY_ENG.pdf [accessed 1 August 2017]
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Rights, is, however, not without its limitations. 
Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights does not compel the 
contracting states to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. The formation 
of the national judicial system naturally infers on the states a certain margin 
of appreciation, allowing them to organise their systems in a manner they 
see fit. Nevertheless, a State, which does set up courts of appeal or courts 
of cassation is required to ensure the respect for fundamental guarantees 
contained in Article 6 to all those who appear before them2.
Different models of Supreme Court jurisdictions in member 
states of the Council of Europe
The states’ margin of appreciation in organising their judicial systems with 
particular regard to the highest levels of jurisdiction is particularly evident 
through the existence of different models set up within the Council of 
Europe member states. In substance, there are three different models: the 
cassation model, the revision model and the appeal model, whilst each 
Supreme Court also has its share of national particularities3. (Lemmens: 2007) 
a. Cassation model
Supreme Courts belonging to the first model, the cassation model, deal 
exclusively with issues of law, not with the facts. “They do not decide 
afresh the case that comes before them. They can either reject an 
appeal or quash the decision of the lower court and remit the case for 
a fresh examination4” (Lemmens: 2007). The Supreme Court is not the 
court of third or in some cases even fourth instance, so the presentation 
of parties’ own points of view and opinions on the subject matter of the 
case are not allowed in the cassation model. Supreme Courts of the 
cassation model do not adjudicate in cases, but rather exercise control 
over courts of general jurisdiction and examine whether their judgments 
2 Delcourt v. Belgium, ECHR 1970, Series A, No. 11, p. 14. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57467 
[accessed 17 June 2017]
3 Lemmens, P., 2008. “Guidance by Supreme Courts to Lower Courts on the Requirements of the European Convention on 
Human Rights”. Proceedings of the Regional Conference: The role of Supreme Courts in the domestic implementation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 - 21 September 2007 Belgrade. Council of Europe, August 2008:36-
52. Available at:  https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Proceedings/Belgrade_PROCEEDINGS&COVER.
pdf [accessed 7 May 2017]
4 Ibid.
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infringe provisions of national legislation. It may thus be said that Supreme 
Courts belonging to the cassation model act as a link between the courts 
of general jurisdiction providing them with coherent guidelines on how to 
apply the law5. (Zembrzuski: 2014).
b. Revision model
Courts of revision, like those of the cassation model, do not deal with facts, 
but only with matters related to breaches of the law. However, they will 
render their decisions on merits only if it is possible for them to do so without 
having to gather new facts. But, if a decision on merits of the case requires 
additional findings of facts, the Supreme Courts of revision model shall 
remit the case for a retrial or fresh examination to the competent court. 
c. Appellate model
Unlike the previous, Supreme Courts of the appellate model may, in 
fact, entertain both questions of fact and those concerning the law. The 
appellate court in this case has the same type of jurisdiction as the (lower) 
court, which brought the first instance decision. In this model, the appellate 
court’s judgement replaces the judgement of the lower court, so there is 
no possibility of retrial or afresh proceedings before any other court6.
Whatever the model, one of the main features that distinguishes the 
Supreme Courts from lower (ordinary) courts is the fact that Supreme 
Courts are on the top of the judicial hierarchy. They are therefore expected 
to “clarify the law, assure its uniform application and adapt the national 
case-law to ever-changing circumstances”7.
Precisely because of their special role in the national legal systems, the 
Supreme Courts play a dual role in domestic legal orders, exercising their 
public and private purpose8. (Jolowitz: 1997) A private purpose could be 
5 Zembrzuski, T., 2014. “Access to the Supreme Court – Polish approach”. Colloquium of the procedural law The functions 
of the Supreme Court – issues of process and administration of justice, 11 - 13 June 2014 Warsaw. University of Warsaw, 
Faculty of Law and Administration 2014. Available at: http://colloquium2014.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/
sites/21/2014/01/ZEMBRZUSKI_-Access-to-the-Supreme-Court_-Polish.pdf [accessed 1 June 2017]
6 Ibid.
7 See mutatis mutandis Lemmens 2008, cited supra.
8 Jolowicz, J.A., 1997. The role of the Supreme Court at the national level a General Report. In Yessiou-Faltsi P., ed. The 
Role of the Supreme Courts at the National and International Level, Athens: Sakkoulas Publications. 
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defined as “achieving, to the maximum possible extent, the application of 
justice according to law to the parties to the litigation before the court”9. 
On the other hand, their public purpose is perceived as wider-reaching, 
through the reviews of the legality of the lower courts’ decisions and the 
fact that, the lower courts are ordinarily bound by the precedents and 
stances established by the Supreme Courts. Moreover, the possibility 
of quashing lower instances’ judgements, which demonstrate clear 
and evident violations of the law is, yet another, significant public task 
exercised by the Supreme Courts.
Many Supreme Courts of the Council of Europe member states position 
themselves as serving more of a public than a private purpose10. (Norkus: 
2015) This is clearly reflected through the existence of various filters imposed 
with regard to the possibility to appeal to the Supreme Courts in those 
countries. In this context, the supreme jurisdictions protect individuals far 
more by providing clear guidance in form of uniform and predictable 
case-law on specific matters, than if they were to feign review of every 
application. The regulation of access to the Supreme Court through various 
filtering mechanisms is ipso facto the result of a compromise between 
the colliding public and private interests, where, on the one hand, the 
necessary balance needs to be achieved between parties’ right to a fair 
trial and the exercise of the principle of the rule of law in their individual 
case and, on the other hand, the public interest of avoiding unnecessary 
engagement of the highest national judicial authority.
Limitations of access to the Supreme Courts (filtering 
mechanisms and models)
The European Court has, on many occasions, held that, “[t]he right of 
access to the court… is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted 
by implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an 
appeal are concerned, since by its very nature it calls for regulation by 
the State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard”11. 
9 Ibid.
10 Norkus, R.., 2015. The Filtering of Appeals to the Supreme Courts. Network of the presidents of the Supreme judicial 
Courts of the EU. Available at http://network-presidents.eu/ [accessed 15 June 2017]
11 Egić v. Croatia, no. 32806/09, ECHR 2014. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-144363 [accessed 17 
June 2017]: §48
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Limitations of right of access to Supreme Courts have their practical 
expression in the form of filtering mechanisms and procedures to be 
followed in order for a case to be eligible for examination at this, highest 
level of national jurisdiction. 
Filtering mechanisms, models and procedure vary from one country to 
another. They generally depend on the functioning model of the Supreme 
Court and its legal position in the national judicial order (in particular with 
regard to whether a Constitutional Court has also been set up in the country). 
For example, a Supreme Court cassation model functions in Lithuania and, 
as a general rule, cassation appeal is not allowed against judgements 
and rulings of the first instance courts, if they had not been reviewed by 
the courts of the appellate instance12. Conversely, in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Norway, Poland, Denmark and Sweden a leapfrog appeal is 
available. However, in these jurisdictions, right to appeal the judgement 
of the court of first instance directly to the Supreme Court is granted only 
in exceptional situations. 
The latter model of filtering appeals before the Supreme Court is called the 
leave-to-appeal system. As mentioned above, the UK, Ireland, Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden are prime examples of this type of filtration. In 
these jurisdictions, a principle of pre-selection or selection “at the door” 
of the appeals to the Supreme Court is applied. The selection of cases 
to be adjudicated before these Supreme Courts is done on the basis 
of quite abstract criteria, emphasizing public purposes of the Supreme 
Court. Specifically, when a decision in a particular case concerns a 
matter of general importance or the interests of justice, it is necessary for 
the case to be heard before the Supreme Court. If not so, as a general 
rule, no substantive reasoning for the decision to refuse leave to appeal 
is provided.
The power to select the cases to be heard before the Supreme Court 
is usually vested in the Supreme Court itself (such as Denmark). It is very 
important to note that countries, which have this kind of filtering of appeals 
to the Supreme Courts usually do not have separate Constitutional Courts 
in their jurisdictions. 
12 Ibid Norkus: 2015: 9
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The second model of filtration of the appeals to the Supreme Court 
includes no judicial filtration stricto sensu. This type of filtration exists in 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Estonia, Spain, Greece and Italy. 
In these countries, the cassation appeal may be brought before the 
Supreme Court only by a special lawyer assigned to the Supreme Court 
or one who fulfils certain prescribed requirements of experience. It is, in 
principle, mandatory for practising lawyers to advise their clients on the 
possible outcomes and thus act as a type of filter for unfounded appeals 
to the Supreme Court13.
The third model may be described as a mixed one. It possesses some of 
the features of both models, occasionally shifting more either to the leave 
to appeal or to no judicial filtration system. This model is, for example, 
present in Lithuania. 
Jurisdiction model and filtering mechanisms of the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Croatia
Government in the Republic of Croatia is based on the trias politica 
principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial 
branches. Judicial power is exercised by the courts. The judiciary is 
autonomous and independent. The courts administer justice according to 
the Constitution, international agreements and treaties, which have been 
signed and ratified and therefore form an integral part of the domestic 
legal system, laws and other valid sources of law.
The administration of justice in the Republic of Croatia is carried out by 
courts, including the misdemeanour courts, municipal courts, commercial 
courts, administrative courts, county courts, the High Misdemeanour 
Court, the High Administrative Court, the High Commercial Court and, of 
course, the Supreme Court, as the highest court.
The role of the Supreme Court is to assure the protection of the rule of law 
and all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. One of 
its most important roles, inter alia, is ensuring the uniform application of 
laws and equal treatment of all citizens before the law. Furthermore, the 
13 Ibid Norkus: 2015: 11.
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Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia discusses current issues related 
to court practice, decides on admissibility and merits of the regular or 
extraordinary legal remedies in accordance with provisions of national 
law and decides upon jurisdictional disputes between lower Croatian 
courts. The Supreme Court also performs other tasks as prescribed by law14. 
The Supreme Court performs its function of the guardian of the rule of law 
(ensuring uniform application of laws and equality of all citizens) mainly 
through its decisions on appeals. Its decisions in specific cases influence 
the practice and decision making of the lower courts15. 
The achievement of goals set before the Supreme Court and the role it 
performs in the Croatian legal system is directly connected to the regime 
of legal remedies, which afford access to the Supreme Court. It is precisely 
because of its special role and position within the Croatian legal system 
hierarchy, that not all cases and appeals may be examined before the 
Supreme Court on merits. The qualities of realisation of the goals set before 
the Supreme Court are intrinsic to the possibility of access to the Supreme 
Court by parties. The Supreme Court would be equally prevented from 
performing its functions if the parties had no possibility of access to the 
Supreme Court, but also if such possibility was too broad based. In both 
of these situations the result would be similar – failure and impossibility of 
the Supreme Court to fulfil its constitutional assignment – to harmonize 
the domestic courts’ practice and thus influence the consequent 
development of the domestic law. 
Similar to the previously described filtering methods and procedures 
existent before other European Supreme Courts, the possibility of access to 
the Croatian Supreme Court is also subject to restrictions. In civil cases, the 
Supreme Court normally decides upon appeal on points of law (ordinary 
or “extraordinary”), which has to be filed after the second instance court 
has brought its (final) decision. Other elements of admissibility are defined 
through provisions of national civil procedural law imposing specific 
restrictions on the right of access. 
14 Law on Courts. 6.03.2013. NN 28/13, 33/15, 82/15, 82/16. Zagreb: Narodne novine. Available at: https://www.nn.hr/ 
[accessed 5 June 2017]
15 Crnić, I. “Presentation of the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia Ivica Crnić at the demonstration 
of the new system of publishing case-law of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia”, Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Croatia, 2003. Available at http://www.vsrh.hr/EasyWeb.asp?pcpid=439 [accessed 12 June 2017]
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Limitations of right of access to courts of supreme 
jurisdiction in the case-law of the European Court
As previously mentioned, the European Court has clearly stated that right 
of access to a court as protected under Article 6 § 1 of the European 
Convention is not absolute. Accordingly, limitations in place for such 
access are not per se incompatible with the Convention.
However, these limitations must not be of such nature to “restrict or 
reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very 
essence of the right is impaired”16 (Guérin v. France 1998); specifically, 
such limitations will only be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they pursue a 
legitimate aim and there is a proportionality between the measures that 
are being used and the aim that is being sought by those measures.
As often repeated throughout its case-law, the task of the European 
Court is not to take the place of the domestic courts in the interpretation 
of national legislation, but rather to verify whether the effects of such 
interpretation are in line with the European Convention. This is particularly 
pertinent to the interpretation of procedural rules, for instance those 
regulating the time-limits for the filing of documents or lodging of legal 
remedies17.
While considering whether the limitations of access to the supreme judicial 
authority are compatible with Article 6 of the Convention, one should 
begin those reflections with the European Court’s acknowledgment that 
the very essence of the role of the Supreme Court is “to deal only with 
matters of the requisite significance”18. 
The compatibility of the limitations envisaged by the national law with 
16 Guérin v. France, no. 25201/94, ECHR 1998. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58204 [accessed 21 
July 2017]
17 See Trevisanato v. Italy, no. 32610/07, ECHR 2016. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-166837 [accessed 
17 June 2017]; Miragall Escolano and others v. Spain, nos. 38366/97, 38688/97 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 41400/98, 
41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98. ECHR 2000.  Avaliable  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58451 
[accessed 15 June 2017] 
18 Dobrić v. Serbia, nos. 2611/07 and 15276/07. ECHR 2011. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105234 
[accessed 17 June 2017]: §45
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the Article 6 of the Convention depends on the particularities of the 
proceedings in question, and the role of the supreme judicial authority in 
the national legal order. Nevertheless, the European Court has emphasised 
that the conditions for the admissibility of the appeal on points of law 
may be stricter than the ones for an ordinary appeal19. Provisions which 
regulate the procedure and time limits for lodging an appeal ensure 
the proper administration of justice. They also serve as guarantors of the 
principle of legal certainty, therefore, as the European Court pointed out: 
“Litigants should expect those rules to be applied”20.
In case Trevisanato v. Italy the Court considered whether the conditions 
for the admissibility of the appeal to the Italian Court of Cassation 
represent the limitation of access to the court, which is contrary to Article 
6 of the Convention. Namely, relevant provisions of the Italian Code of 
Civil Procedure prescribe that the petitioner must explicitly state the legal 
principle, which has allegedly been breached. Since the applicant in the 
Trevisanato case failed to formulate such legal principle, his appeal was 
dismissed. The Court of Cassation asserted that the lack of appropriate 
wording as to the point of law at issue, precluded it from identifying the 
substance of appeal and its reasoning. The applicant argued before the 
European Court that the decision of the Court of Cassation was excessively 
formalistic, as the legal issue in question could have been identified from 
the wording of the appeal. 
The European Court established that the legitimate aim of provisions 
governing the admissibility conditions is to maintain legal certainty, as well 
as proper administration of justice. It further concluded that this limitation 
was proportionate, as it did not place an excessive burden on the 
applicant, who could have simply formulated the legal point in question, 
enabling the Court of Cassation to respond to it by setting up “regula 
iuris”, which could be applied in similar issues. Thus, given the specific role 
of the Court of Cassation in (internal) Italian legal order, the European 
Court had found that dismissal of the applicant’s appeal on points of law 
was not overly formalistic in the context of Article 6 of the Convention. 
19 See Trevisanto v. Italy: 2016: §34, Khalfaoui v. France, no 34791/97, ECHR 1999. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-58374 [accessed 21 July 2017]: §37
20 See Trevisanato v. Italy, 2016: §32 and Miragall Escolano and others v. Spain, 2000: §33
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Unlike the Trevisanato case, where the European Court established that 
the impugned rule on admissibility was explicitly articulated in the national 
law and was not the judge-made rule, in Beles and others v. the Czech 
Republic21 it found, inter alia, the violation of the right of access to a court 
because the Supreme Court had the discretionary power of granting the 
leave to appeal on points of law. Such decision was based solely on the 
opinion of the Supreme Court on whether the disputed decision raised 
issues of crucial legal importance. This prevented the applicants and their 
lawyers from assessing their prospects of obtaining leave from the Supreme 
Court. In the event of leave to appeal on points of law being refused, there 
was a risk that the applicants’ constitutional appeal would have been 
dismissed as being lodged out of time. The European Court concluded 
that requiring the applicants to lodge appeals with both the Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Court on the same grounds would have 
created legal uncertainty, which had not facilitated proper administration 
of justice, as it prevented litigants from using an available remedy.
In the case Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, the Court deemed 
that access to the Supreme Court had been denied based on an 
unreasonable construction of a procedural requirement, which prevented 
a claim for compensation from being examined on its merits. In this case, 
the applicants lodged an administrative complaint to the Supreme Court, 
which was dismissed because it had been lodged outside the time-limit, 
namely, after the expiry of one year since the delivery of the impugned 
decision. However, the applicants were not parties in the proceedings 
in which the decision was taken, and, furthermore, were unaware of it 
until it was published in the Official Gazette, although the decision itself 
did concern their interests. The European Court has emphasized that the 
applicants “must be able to avail themselves of the possibility to lodge an 
appeal from the moment they can effectively apprise themselves of court 
decisions imposing a burden on them or which may infringe their legitimate 
rights or interests”22. Otherwise, the courts could substantially reduce the 
time for lodging an appeal or even render any appeal impossible by 
delaying service of their decisions. On such basis, the European Court 
concluded that domestic courts’ particularly strict interpretation of a 
procedural rule, deprived the applicants of the right of access to a court.
21 Beles v. the Czech Republic, no. 47273/99. ECHR 2002. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-60750 
[acessed 8 June 2017]
22 Miragall Escolano and others v. Spain, 2000: §37
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The issue of deadlines for filing applications to the supreme judicial 
authority has also been considered by the Court in the case of Tence v. 
Slovenia23, but with regard to the practical aspect of using means other 
than personal or postal submission of the appeal on points of law. The 
applicant submitted her appeal on points of law on the last day of the 
prescribed deadline using a fax machine, whilst the original document 
was submitted by regular post the following day. Relying exclusively on the 
fact that the original document containing the appeal on points of law 
had been submitted after the expiry of the time limit, and disregarding the 
fax transmission altogether (finding that the applicant was unable to prove 
the content of the document sent by fax), the Supreme Court dismissed 
the appeal as lodged out of time. The Supreme Court also emphasised 
that any faults in the transmission of a document sent by fax, even if 
attributable to the court, had to be borne by the party submitting such 
a document. However, the latter conclusion of the Supreme Court had 
been based on the case-law developed after the applicant had already 
filed her appeal on points of law by fax, which is why at the time of filing 
her appeal by fax there was no basis for her to consider that what was 
recorded as a successful and timely fax transmission, could nonetheless 
result in the rejection of the appeal as out of time. The European Court thus 
concluded that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of procedural rules 
in the given circumstances was overly rigid, imposing a disproportionate 
burden on the applicant, which ultimately led to her inability of accessing 
the Supreme Court. 
In certain cases it is not the interpretation of domestic procedural rules 
governing access to supreme jurisdiction that infringes the individuals’ 
right of access to a court, but rather the legislation itself, which does not 
lend itself to any interpretation. 
The case of Clionov v. the Republic of Moldova24 relates to the issue 
of payment of court fees in proceedings before the Supreme Court. In 
accordance with the national procedural provisions valid at the relevant 
time, appeals on points of law before the Supreme Court could not be 
23 Tence v. Slovenia, no. 37242/14, ECHR 2016. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-163352 [accessed 17 
June 2017]
24 Clionov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 13229/04, ECHR 2007. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-82595 
[accessed 17 June 2017]
XXIV
 (81) - 2018
81
subject to any exemption from court fees, regardless of the appellant’s 
financial situation. This general prohibition of waiving court fees was 
essentially contrary to the right of access to a court, as guaranteed under 
Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention. 
In a number of cases concerning access to supreme jurisdictions, the 
European Court has also dealt with the issues of the rationae valoris criteria 
applied in many European legal systems as one of the filters for accessing 
supreme jurisdictions.  In that regard, the European Court has held that 
setting the financial threshold for appeals to the Supreme Court is not 
contrary to Convention per se, as it pursues a legitimate aim of preventing 
overload of the Supreme Court with cases of lesser importance25. However, 
the issue of whether the interpretation of the rationae valoris rule, in light 
of the circumstances of a particular case infringed the right of access 
to the supreme jurisdiction, remains to be examined on a case-by-case 
basis.
Recent judgment of the European Court in the case of Zubac v. Croatia26 
concerns the lack of access to a court due to a combination of two 
factors: a mistake made by lower instance courts and, subsequently, 
an exceedingly formalistic interpretation of procedural rules governing 
the rationae valoris principle by the Supreme Court. In particular, under 
relevant Croatian legislation the plaintiff is obliged to indicate the value 
of his claim in his action. Should he fail to do so, or should the first instance 
court find that the value stated in the action is clearly incorrect (set either 
too high or too low), it shall verify the value of the claim at the early 
stages of the proceedings, before examination of the merits. In his initial 
action, the applicant’s predecessor indicated the value of his claim lower 
than the rationae valoris threshold for filing the appeal on points of law. 
Subsequently, during the first instance proceedings on merits, he raised 
the initially indicated value over the prescribed rationae valoris threshold, 
even though he was not permitted to do so under national legislation. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared his appeal on points of law 
inadmissible as not meeting the rationae valoris criteria. 
25 Bulfacht v. Croatia, no. 53261/08, ECHR 2011. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105215 [accessed 16 
June 2017]
26 Zubac v. Croatia, no. 40160/12, ECHR 2016. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-167114 [accessed 30 
June 2017]
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However, the European Court held that the particular circumstances of 
the case (specifically the fact that the lower courts had calculated costs 
and expenses of proceedings using the raised value of the claim) lead to 
the conclusion that the interpretation of procedural rules by the Supreme 
Court had been overly rigid, in a manner, which imposed on the applicant 
an excessive individual burden of mistakes made by the lower courts and 
prevented his access to the Supreme Court. 
It is interesting to note that the European Court held that existence of long-
term case-law of the Supreme Court with regard to the rationae valoris 
principle, consistent with the Supreme Court’s conclusion on inadmissibility 
of the applicant’s appeal on points of law, was of no relevance. This 
was so because, in the European Court’s view, the inadmissibility of the 
appeal on points of law was essentially caused by the errors made by 
lower courts, which contrary to domestic law, acted as if the change in 
the value of the claim at the later stage of the proceedings was, in fact, 
allowed and accepted. On that basis, the European Court concluded 
that the Supreme Court’s interpretation (or rather the ignoring of the lower 
court’s mistakes) was, “contrary to the general principle of procedural 
fairness inherent in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention” (Zubac 2017:§ 40).
It is further worth noting that the Chamber adopted the Zubac judgment 
by four votes to three. In a joint dissenting opinion, honourable judges 
Lemmens, Griţko and Ravarani found there was no reason to hold that 
conclusions of the Supreme Court had been contrary to the Convention. 
In particular, the Supreme Court could not be bound by the (implicit) 
determination of lower courts with regard to the value of the claim, but 
rather relied on specific provisions of domestic law and its own long-
standing case-law in dismissing the appeal on points of law in this particular 
case. Dissenting opinion especially critiques the notion of “general 
procedural fairness inherent in Article 6 § 1”, which was introduced by 
the majority. Finding this new notion unclear, the minority questioned its 
connection to the right of access to a court as the only right at issue in this 
particular case. 
Moreover, the minority questioned the majority conclusion that the case 
concerned mistakes made by national courts, since the initial mistake 
was in fact made by the applicant’s predecessor who indicated a higher 
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value of the claim at the stage of the proceedings at which such action 
was not allowed. Even though the lower courts did not declare such 
action unlawful, this could not have created a reasonable expectation 
of the applicant’s predecessor that his appeal on points of law would 
have been admissible.   
As the Croatian Government’s request for referral of the Zubac case to 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court was accepted, it remains to 
be seen what the final outcome of the case will be. 
At this point, the content of the European Court’s case-law regarding the 
issue of access to the supreme jurisdictions shows that the examination of 
such cases has more to do with individual circumstances of each case 
(which are naturally of factual nature) than with any general notion, be it 
the right to a fair trial or “general procedural fairness inherent in Article 6 
§ 1”, as stated in Zubac27.
Effect of the European Court’s judgments on 
removing obstacles for access to supreme 
jurisdictions
Judgments of the European Court have an effect on national legal systems 
of member states, which greatly surpasses their seemingly declaratory 
character (and the usual payment of just satisfaction to the applicants in 
respective cases). In particular, Article 46 § 1 of the European Convention 
obliges member states to comply with the European Court’s judgments, 
which relate to them. This is done primarily through the implementation 
of measures of general character, aimed at eliminating the causes of 
the violations found, and thus, preventing the possibility of future similar 
violations of individual rights. 
Accordingly, violations of the right of access to supreme jurisdictions 
found in judgments of the European Court have warranted certain 
27  Ibid
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changes, either in the legislation governing the filtering of appeals to 
these jurisdictions or in the interpretation of these rules by the national 
courts of the Member State to which a particular judgment refers. 
Generally speaking, the scope of measures that may be applied by the 
states in order to remove underlying causes of the violation of access to 
supreme jurisdictions is limited to, either legislative changes (when the 
violation was caused by the content of provisions of relevant domestic 
laws) or, more frequently, measures that can and should affect the 
necessary changes in the case-law of domestic courts examining the 
admissibility of applications lodged to Supreme Courts. 
For example, following the findings of the European Court in Clionov v. the 
Republic of Moldova (merits described above), in order to prevent similar 
violations of the Convention in the future, Moldovan authorities have 
amended relevant legislation so that it now provides for the possibility to 
request exemption from court fees or the deferral of their payment. Under 
the amended legislation, in case the appellant requests exemption or 
deferral of payment of court fees, the appeal on the points of law shall 
not be dismissed and the panel of three judges shall decide whether to 
grant the request28. Thus, the European Court’s judgment has led to the 
removal of restriction of access to the Supreme Court, which was contrary 
to the European Convention.
A similar situation also occurred, with regard to the European Court’s 
judgment in the case of Miragall Escolano v. Spain (also analysed 
above). In the process of execution of the said judgment, the Spanish 
authorities amended relevant legislation setting clear guidelines for the 
identification of the first day of the time-limit allowed for lodging appeals29. 
These amendments had led to closure of the examination of the case 
by the Committee of Ministers, and were clearly an effective method 
of prevention of similar violations, as there have been no other similar 
pending cases against Spain before the European Court. 
Markedly different, in Tence v. Slovenia, the Government of the 
28 Status of execution of judgment in Clionov v. the Republic of Moldova. Available at: http://hudoc.exec.coe.int/
eng?i=004-6798 [accessed 21 July 2017]
29 Final resolution of the Committee of Ministers in Miragall Escolano and others v. Spain no. ResDH(2001)158: 2001 
Available at: http://hudoc.exec.coe.int/eng?i=001-56011 [accessed 21 July 2017]
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Respondent State deemed sufficient to undertake awareness raising 
measures, as acquainting of domestic courts’ with the conclusions 
expressed in the judgment of the European Court shall, in their view, be 
sufficiently effective for preventing similar violations of the Convention in 
the future30. Such a stance remains to be assessed by the Committee of 
Ministers with regard to its effectiveness in prevention of similar violations 
of the European Convention in the future.
Conclusion
Right of access to a court, guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the European 
Convention, though generally encompassing all levels of national 
jurisdiction, nonetheless shows some restrictions do apply. 
However, such restrictions must not impair the very essence of the right 
of access to a court. In particular, the Court held that, in order to remain 
compatible with Article 6 of the Convention, restrictions of the right of 
access to a court must necessarily pursue a legitimate aim, and the 
means employed (the limitations placed on the right of access) must be 
proportionate to the aim pursued. This general rule is applicable to all levels 
of national jurisdiction, including highest judicial authorities (Supreme or 
Cassation Courts).
It will be interesting to see how the European Court’s case-law will further 
develop on the issue, particularly in the case Zubac v. Croatia, which 
is currently pending before the Grand Chamber, which is expected to 
provide specific guidelines as to the application of the rationae valoris 
criteria in access to highest national courts. 
30 Action Report of Slovenia in the case of Tence v. Slovenia. 2017. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/168070c4e9 [accessed 
31 July 2017]
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